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Natural disasters are an important source of vulnerability in the Caribbean region. 
Despite being one of the more disaster-prone areas of the world, it has the lowest 
levels of insurance coverage. This paper examines the vulnerability of Belize’s 
public finance to the occurrence  of hurricanes and the potential impact of 
insurance instruments in reducing that vulnerability. The paper finds that 
catastrophic risk insurance significantly improves Belize’s debt sustainability. In 
addition, the methodology employed makes it possible to estimate the appropriate 
level of insurance, which for the case of Belize is a maximum coverage of 
US$120 million per year. International organizations can play a role in assisting 
countries to overcome distortions in insurance markets, as well as in helping to 
relax internal political resistance to the purchase of insurance policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the vulnerability of Belize’s public finances to the occurrence of large 
natural disasters and the possible use of insurance instruments to reduce that vulnerability. 
Natural disasters cause an abrupt increase in government spending both for relief activities and to 
restore infrastructure and facilities that have been damaged or destroyed. Although international 
aid usually helps to defray those costs to some extent, the experience of Belize and other 
frequently affected developing countries is that disasters result in an increase in government debt 
and a higher risk that debt may reach an unsustainable level. With the development of insurance 
and reinsurance markets for natural disasters, and the initiatives sponsored by the World Bank 
and other institutions to facilitate access to those markets by Caribbean economies, countries like 
Belize now have an opportunity to reduce their public finance vulnerability to disasters. This 
paper attempts to evaluate the reduction in debt vulnerability that can be achieved through 
disaster insurance and computes the optimal level of insurance from the point of view of debt 
sustainability. 
In two recent papers, Robert Barro (2006a, 2006b) has shown that the occurrence of 
infrequent economic disasters has much larger welfare costs than continuous  economic 
fluctuations of less amplitude. Barro estimated that, for the typical advanced economy, the 
welfare cost associated with large economic disasters such as those experienced in the twentieth 
century (wars, economic depressions, financial crises) amounted to about 20 percent of annual 
GDP, while normal business cycle volatility only amounted to about 1.5 percent of GDP. For 
developing countries, which usually suffer from a larger propensity to disasters of all types, and 
of even larger magnitude than in advanced economies, these events have an even greater effect 
on the welfare of the average citizen.  Of the more than 6,000 natural disasters recorded during 
1970-2002, three-fourths of the events and 99 percent of the people affected were in developing 
countries (Rasmussen, 2004). At the macro level, Rasmussen finds that the 12 large natural 
disasters in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) produced a median reduction in 
same-year GDP growth of 2.2 percentage points and a median increase in the current account 
deficit equal to 10.8 percent of GDP. In addition to their direct costs, large catastrophic risks 
pose a major challenge for public finances, and for debt sustainability in particular. And reaching 
a position of unsustainable public debt usually results in further financial and economic distress 
for the country.   5  
In the case of case of Belize, a Central American country of 300,000 people and a GDP 
of approximately US$1 billion, natural disasters are the source of relatively frequent events of 
catastrophic proportions. For example, the last two hurricanes that hit Belize, Keith in 2000 and 
Iris in 2001, caused some of the worst damage ever in the country. According to available 
estimates, the costs amounted to 33 percent of GDP (US$280 million) and 6 percent of GDP 
(US$50 million), respectively.
2 The increase in government expenditures associated with these 
two storms reached $50 million and spread over three fiscal cycles (2000/01, 2001/02 and 
2002/03). The severity of the impact on public finances is illustrated by the country’s fiscal 
performance in the aftermath of the events. The primary fiscal deficit increased from 2.2 percent 
of GDP in fiscal year 1998/99 (just before the two storms) to 7.3 percent of GDP in 2000/01. The 
overall deficit increased from 4.1 percent to 9.7 percent of GDP in the same period and remained 
above 8 percent of GDP until fiscal year 2005/06, while total debt increased from approximately 
40 percent of GDP in 1998/99 to over 100 percent in 2003/04. As the country’s fiscal position 
worsened its debt dynamics became increasingly unsustainable, and Belize eventually required a 
restructuring operation for public debt in 2006. Although not all the fiscal imbalances that have 
developed since the late 1990s may be directly associated with the storms, the government 
believes that the spending increases that led to the large deficits and debt accumulation were 
necessary to pay for reconstruction in the aftermath of the hurricanes.
3  
Belize is a vivid example of the damage that hurricanes can cause to public finances and 
debt sustainability, but it is by no means an isolated case. Freeman, Keen and Mani (2003) 
document the increased incidence of natural disasters in developing countries, particularly small 
island states and low-lying coastal states. Relatively poor countries are particularly vulnerable 
because they have a higher proportion of poor population who are often priced out of safer areas 
and living in disaster-prone areas. Additionally, developing countries are typically poorly insured 
against catastrophic risk, in part as a consequence of the limited availability of affordable 
insurance options, but also because the private sector probably expects a bailout from the 
government in the aftermath of a severe storm; governments in turn expect to receive aid from 
external donors. According to Freeman et al. (2003), the consequences of natural disasters go 
                                                       
2 The economic impact of a disaster usually consists of direct costs, such as damage to infrastructure, crops, and 
housing,  and indirect economic losses, such as drops in tax revenues, unemployment, and market instability.  See 
“EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database.”  
3 See Government of Belize (2006).    6  
beyond the direct costs associated with physical damage. They are also typically associated with: 
(i) a worsening of the fiscal position as governments pay for reconstruction and sources of 
revenue are disrupted; (ii) a worsening of the trade balance as the exporting capacity is hampered 
and imports for reconstruction surge; (iii) downward pressure on the exchange rate due to the 
worsening of the trade balance and concerns about the repayment capacity of the government by 
international investors; and (iv) inflationary pressures. Therefore, the total impact on the budget 
widely exceeds the direct costs of relief and reconstruction from the disasters. 
For this reason, there is broad consensus on the need to design fiscal management 
policies to resist the stress caused by the occurrence of disasters. Freeman et al. (2003) consider 
ways to create the necessary fiscal space to deal with catastrophic risk. Among various 
alternatives, they advocate treating natural disasters as a contingent liability for the national 
government (although they are skeptical about its practical feasibility, particularly in low-income 
countries). A more substantive initiative would be to implement an annual budgetary allocation 
to provide for natural disaster expenditure when needed. Mexico’s FODEN (Fondo Nacional de 
Desastres Naturales) provides this kind of fiscal provisioning against the risk of any type of 
natural disasters. But these measures, while prudent, amount to forms of self-insurance, which 
are not economically efficient in this case. 
There is broad agreement that insurance—or debt contracts with insurance-like 
features—provides a superior alternative in the case of events such as natural disasters.
4 In the 
case of temporary shocks, whose effect is reversed over time, and where countries do not face 
borrowing constraints in global markets during periods of economic distress, a strategy of 
borrowing and saving, such as those applied by stabilization funds, could be fully appropriate.
5 
But in the case of shocks that cause permanent losses and uneven access to capital markets, 
insurance schemes represent a superior strategy.  
Implementing disaster insurance in developing countries, however, faces two types of 
obstacles: market unavailability and political resistance. For a number of reasons, markets have 
traditionally been insufficiently developed or simply nonexistent. More recently, however, 
advances such as the development of parametric insurance policies have expanded the 
                                                       
4 Borensztein et al (2005), Hofman and Brukkof (2006), Caballero and Cowan (2006). 
5 Even in this case, there are caveats, as it all depends on the price charged for the market insurance (or whether that 
market exists). Ehrlich and Becker (1972) show that self-insurance and market insurance are substitutes, and may 
coexist in equilibrium.   7  
availability of coverage for countries and households. Instead of basing payments on an estimate 
of the damage suffered, parametric insurance contracts establish the payout as a function of the 
occurrence or intensity of certain natural phenomenon, as determined by a specialized agency 
such as the U.S. National Hurricane Center or the U.S. National Earthquake Information Center. 
In this way, the transaction costs and uncertainty associated with insurance payments are 
considerably reduced. There is no need to verify and estimate damages, and no potential 
disagreement or litigation about the payouts. Moreover, the country has immediate access to the 
resources when the disaster takes place. Political reluctance to engage in insurance purchase 
derives from the fact that there is little benefit for the political leadership from entering insurance 
contracts. Insurance involves costs today and a possible payoff some time in the future, when the 
government may have changed hands. And because disasters are natural phenomena and 
politicians cannot be blamed for their occurrence, there are weak incentives to take relatively 
complex measures, such as market insurance, to offset some of the costs.  
The prospects for disaster insurance in the Caribbean region have been enhanced 
considerably with the creation of the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), 
under the leadership of the World Bank (see World Bank, 2006). This facility will act as a 
financial intermediary between the participating countries and the international reinsurance 
market, allowing participating governments in the Caribbean region to purchase insurance that 
would provide them with immediate assistance after the occurrence of an earthquake or the 
passing of a hurricane. The proposed insurance coverage will rely on parametric techniques and 
coverage will be calculated such that the instrument provides business interruption insurance 
against budgetary losses caused by hurricanes and earthquakes. That is, the government will 
have available the financial means to continue to operate and start recovery activities 
immediately. It is expected that the aggregation of the individual risks into a large and diversified 
portfolio will help achieve lower costs for the reinsurance coverage. Moreover, the creation of 
this instrument with the support of international institutions and donors would create incentives 
and peer pressure to help overcome internal political resistance to the purchase of insurance 
policies. Furthermore, the recent success of the Mexican government in the issuance of 
catastrophe bonds (as will be discussed below) may indicate that disaster insurance markets are 
becoming increasingly available and cheaper, which would open the door for individual   8  
countries to supplement the CCRIF facility and tailor their disaster coverage by themselves over 
time. 
These efforts by the World Bank and other institutions respond to the extreme 
vulnerability of the Caribbean region to natural disasters. According to Rasmussen (2004),
6 
despite being one of the more disaster-prone areas of the world, the Caribbean region has the 
lowest levels of insurance coverage, with less than 4 percent of disaster damage covered by 
insurance, compared with more than 30 percent in North America, the region with the highest 
coverage.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe in further detail the 
fiscal impact of natural disasters in the experience of Belize. Then, we explore which instruments 
are available for governments to insure public finances against catastrophic risk. The next step is 
to perform a debt sustainability analysis for Belize in order to quantify the potential benefits 
from the different insurance scenarios. Finally, we explore some of the problems associated with 
insurance schemes and how to address them. We end with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Debt Dynamics and Catastrophic Risk: The Case of Belize 
Belize is located in one of the most active hurricane areas of the world. According to EM-DAT, 
an online emergency disaster database sponsored by USAID and CRED,
7  between 1931 to 2006, 
10 wind storms have directly hit Belize, killing an average of 184 people per event,
8 injuring 57, 
and causing an average total cost of US$41 million per event.
9  
The last two hurricanes that hit Belize (Keith in 2000 and Iris in 2001) caused some of 
the worst damage ever according to EM-DAT estimates: 33 percent and 6 percent of GDP,  
respectively. The direct fiscal cost of these two storms, measured as the increase in expenditures 
for reconstruction, was US$50 million. It is worth emphasizing that this is the lower bound of the 
total fiscal cost because it comprises only the spending for emergency reconstruction recorded in 
the operations of the Central Government over the three fiscal years between 2000 and 2003.
10 
                                                       
6 Also see studies cited in the paper. 
7 USAID: United Sates Agency for International Development. CRED: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters. 
8 Belize’s average total population is approximately 300,000 people. 
9 EM-DAT reports damages in constant US$ of 2000. 
10 IMF Article-IV reports, several issues.   9  
Therefore, this cost estimate does not include either the lost revenue as a consequence of the 
storms or the worsening of debt costs as a consequence of the debt increase. 
The bilateral and multilateral aid received by Belize was insufficient to cover the increase 
in expenditures. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, bilateral and multilateral aid flows did not 
increase significantly in the aftermath of the 2000 and 2001 hurricanes. Note that the spike in 
bilateral aid corresponds to an unusually large donation from the United Kingdom (the former 
colonial ruler of Belize) in the year 1999 that predated the first of the two major hurricanes that 
struck Belize in 2000 and 2001. Interestingly, this aid shortfall does not appear to be a unique 
feature of the case of Belize. Bobba and Powell (2006), using a large panel dataset, find no 
evidence that natural disasters affect the pattern of bilateral and multilateral aid flows. In other 
words, controlling for other determinants of aid, the occurrence of natural disasters does not have 
a statistically significant effect of increasing international aid. This suggests that the expectation 
of large aid inflows in the aftermath of natural disasters might be unwarranted.
11  
The low levels of private insurance observed in the region, along with the limited 
diversification of risk feasible at the domestic level in a small economy such as Belize, created a 
large volume of contingent liabilities for the Government, which were triggered in the aftermath 
of the natural disasters of 2000 and 2001.  
The fiscal primary deficit increased from 2.2 percent of GDP in fiscal year 1998/99 (just 
before the two majors storms hit the country) to 7.3 percent of GDP in 2000/01. The overall 
deficit increased from 4.1 percent to 9.7 percent of GDP in the same period, while total debt 
increased from approximately 40 percent of GDP in 1998/99 to over 100 percent of GDP in 
2003/04. Although not all the deterioration in the fiscal accounts resulted directly from the 
disasters (e.g., there was a public sector wage increase of up to 8 percent in each of the three 
years ending in 2005/06, which added some 1.5 percent of GDP to government expenditures), 
the combination of the large scale of the disasters with low levels of private insurance and 
limited foreign aid in the aftermath of the storms led the government to increase the deficit and 
issue external debt to pay for emergency relief and reconstruction of infrastructure. The end 
result was that the country’s debt dynamics became increasingly unsustainable as the servicing 
                                                       
11 The lack of contemporaneous correlation between natural disasters and international aid in the data is not enough 
to rule out a relationship between the two variables, as the (ex ante) level of aid flows could be determined by the 
likelihood of a disaster. In other words, disaster-prone areas might always receive more aid flows in anticipation of 
shocks.   10  
of external debt became more and more expensive. Repeated refinancing operations led to a 
continuous rise in borrowing costs, with the effective weighted average interest rate on the 
external public debt owed to private creditors increasing from 6.4 percent in 2003 to 11.3 percent 
in 2006.  This increase in the cost of servicing the debt also had its effect on fiscal performance, 
and interest expenses climbed from 2 percent of GDP in 1999/2000 to 5.9 percent of GDP in 
2005/06, with an additional expenditure of 2.7 percent of GDP on account of fees and charges 
for re-profiling debt and arranging external loans. By fiscal year 2005/2006, the burden of 
interest on public debt reached 25 percent of fiscal revenues (see Glenday and  Shukla, 2006). 
In light of this fragile situation, Belize formally announced in August 2006 its intention 
to start negotiations with private foreign creditors to restructure debt instruments and seek a 
relief in payment terms. The public offer was opened in December 2006, and the formal 
negotiations ended on January 26, 2007. 
Beyond the specifics of the debt restructuring process undertaken by Belize, it is clear 
that the debt problems that led to that process resulted largely from natural disasters. Thus, the 
government’s objective of achieving a sustainable debt path would require reducing the impact 
of future natural disasters on fiscal accounts and indebtedness. It is in this context that 
government fiscal insurance for natural disasters provides a promising tool to support these 
objectives. 
 
3. Instruments for Catastrophic Insurance 
Governments in countries that are vulnerable to natural disasters appear to have only a limited 
set of options available to insure public finances against those risks. Hofman and Brukoff (2006) 
survey some recent initiatives in this regard. The modalities of risk transfer for public finances, 
to the extent that they exist, are similar to the ones used by the private sector. For example, 
among the particular modalities of risk transfer that are relevant for catastrophic risk they 
document the importance of reinsurance. The risk characteristics of catastrophe insurance claims 
differ from other insurance products. A company providing car insurance can achieve a good 
diversification if it has many clients, because in that case the volume of claims would be 
predictable with a high level of accuracy. In contrast, natural disasters are low-probability events 
that cause extremely large losses when they occur, and thus not easily diversifiable in the same 
way as car insurance. This low level of possible diversification tends to increase the cost of   11  
insurance. Primary insurers need to transfer a considerable share of their catastrophe exposure to 
large reinsurers, namely, companies that act as insurers of the retail insurance companies. The 
increased reliance on reinsurers increases the cost of primary insurance, reducing its 
attractiveness and scope. With less available insurance for the private sector, the contingent 
liabilities of the government increase. In recent years, reinsurers themselves have also begun to 
rely more on capital markets to reduce their own exposure.  
The success of the private catastrophe bond markets (“cat bonds”) has prompted 
governments and international institutions to explore their use as a mean of shielding 
governmental budgets from the impact of natural disasters. A catastrophe bond is a tradable 
instrument that facilitates the transfer of the risk of a catastrophic event to capital markets. A 
typical structure is one in which the investors purchase a safe bond, such as a U.S. Treasury 
bond, for the desired amount of coverage and deposit it with a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
institution, which is legally distinct from the parties. The investors collect the interest on the 
bond plus the insurance premium that is paid by the insured party while the disaster does not 
occur. If the disaster strikes, however, their claim is extinguished and the SPV sells the bond and 
transfers the funds to the insured.  
In May 2006, the Mexican government obtained earthquake insurance by means of cat 
bonds and a direct purchase of coverage from international reinsurers for a total coverage of US$ 
450 million. (see IDB, 2007, Box 14.2) These instruments provide parametric insurance, which 
means that predetermined payouts will be made in case of the occurrence of an earthquake in 
three at-risk areas of the country’s  Pacific coast and around Mexico City. This is the first 
catastrophe bond placed by a Latin American country and is expected to be the first step in the 
Mexican government’s plan to secure insurance against natural disasters, including hurricanes. 
Mexico has been operating a disaster fund, the FODEN, since 1996 as a saving vehicle to build 
up resources to be used by local governments in case of a major earthquake, but the fund had 
become nearly depleted, and the scheme was recognized as economically inefficient and 
vulnerable to political voracity.  
In the Caribbean case, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) is 
intended to provide the financial instruments, expert advice, and donor support to encourage all 
countries in the region to obtain coverage against hurricanes and earthquakes. By pooling all the 
countries in a portfolio, the CCRIF expects to gain scale economies and diversification, since the   12  
losses caused by any given event tend to be concentrated in one or two countries only, implying 
that the correlation of risks among the whole group of countries is low. The capitalization 
provided by international donors and the expert assistance provided by the World Bank will 
further reduce costs to the participating countries, and peer pressure will encourage politicians to 
join the facility. 
 
4. Disaster Insurance and Debt Sustainability 
This section analyzes the potential contribution of disaster insurance to debt sustainability in 
Belize. The framework used for debt sustainability analysis is in line with the nascent literature 
that incorporates the structure of random shocks hitting the domestic economy to obtain a 
complete distribution of probable outcomes for the debt to GDP ratio, rather than simply 
projecting one central scenario.  This approach recognizes that even when the government is 
resolute in pursuing its fiscal targets, the outcomes are subject to significant risks, especially as 
the planning horizon lengthens.
12  
To focus on the case of Belize, we assume that the government issues only foreign-
currency denominated debt,
13 paying interest rate r
f , and that the country is prone to natural 
disasters (in this exercise, hurricanes) which, when they happen, lead to additional borrowing to 
pay for reconstruction. In this case the evolution of the debt to GDP ratio follows the standard 
equation augmented by the incidence of hurricanes on primary expenditures:  
1
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where  t d  is the debt-GDP ratio,  t y Δ  is the rate of growth of GDP,  t f  is the primary surplus of 
the budget, and  ( )t H Category  is the budgetary cost of a hurricane which is an increasing 
function of its category (intensity).
14 In a year without hurricanes, H(0)=0. 
Next, assume that the government purchases catastrophic risk insurance through, for 
example, the CCRIF facility. In that case, the debt to GDP ratio is given by the following 
modified version of equation (1):    
                                                       
12 This exercise is very similar in spirit to García and Rigobón (2004), Celasun, Debrun and Ostry (2006),  and 
Ferrucci and Penalver (2003). 
13 Belize has maintained a fixed exchange rate regime since 1976 and is committed to maintaining it. Therefore there 
is no exchange rate risk associated with the country’s debt dynamics.   13  
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where  () PM is the insurance premium that is a function of M, the insurance coverage limit (the 
prescribed payout), and  (, ) I M Category  is the insurance payout function which depends 
positively on the preset limit, and on the hurricane’s intensity level. The insurance premium is a 
cost that reduces the government’s primary surplus, so it enters with a positive sign on the right-
hand side of equation (2). As with any insurance policy, the premium is paid every year, but the 
payoffs are triggered only in the aftermath of a verifiable hurricane. If there are no hurricanes in 
a given year, then I(M,0)=0. 
To illustrate the range of likely debt to GDP ratios for the period between 2006 and 2020 
we follow three steps. First, we generate 1,000 random realizations of the stochastic variables 
t y Δ , 
f
t r , and t f  for each year, using the IMF’s forecasts for the years 2007 to 2011 as the 
baseline values.
15 The stochastic shocks to each series are assumed to follow a normal 
distribution with mean zero and standard deviations that are based on their historic volatility.
16 
The forecasts and standard deviations used are shown in Table 1. Note that although we are 
formally treating all the variables as independent from each other in our simulations (i.e., we set 
the covariance of shocks equal to zero), the fact that we are using the IMF forecasts already 
incorporates some correlation between the variables. The projected levels of 
f
t r are 
disaggregated into its component parts: the U.S. Treasury bond yield and the sovereign spread 
over US Treasuries, which captures the country’s credit risk.  
Second, we generate realizations for the random variable  ( )t H Category . In line with 
historical data (see World Bank, 2006) we divide the hurricanes into 7 categories, with each 
category having different probability of occurrence and implying a different level of cost to the 
economy, as shown in Table 2. Note that the probability of occurrence of a hurricane of any level 
of intensity in a given year is approximately 33 percent.  We simulate 1,000 stochastic series of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
14 We assume, for simplicity, that not more than one hurricane can hit Belize per year. The assumption is not 
restrictive, as multiple mild hurricanes might be equivalent, in terms of total costs, to a single severe one. 
15 The IMF, in its latest Article IV consultation staff report (October 2006), provides forecasts for the variables of 
interest until the year 2011. For the years 2012 to 2020 there are no forecasts, so we simply extend the previous ones 
forward. Although this is not the best solution, an alternative would have been to run the simulations up to 2011 
only, which would not be very informative in illustrating the effect of low-probability events such as hurricanes. 
16 For most variables we have approximately 10 years of historic information.   14  
the variable ( )t H Category  by means of building a random sample with replacement based on the 
probability distribution shown in Table 2.  
The values for  () PM  and I (M, Category) are obtained from World Bank (2006), 
applying interpolation. Table 3 summarizes the different maximum coverage limits M that would 
correspond to different premium payments, P(M). The actual insurance payouts I (M, Category) 
depend on the Category of the hurricane and its projected associated costs, which are estimated 
ex ante based on historic data and are part of the insurance contract. In the event that there is a 
hurricane on a given year whose projected cost is less than M, then the insurance payout for that 
event is limited to the amount of the projected cost. If the projected cost of a hurricane is equal 
to, or exceeds M, then the payout is limited to M.  
Finally, we simulate the path of  t d using equations (1) and (2). The “fans” in Figure 2 
represent the range of values that have 98 percent of probability of occurrence. In other words, 
after excluding the 2 percent of simulations that yield the most extreme values for the debt to 
GDP ratio, the remaining values span the range plotted in Figure 2. The baseline scenario (i.e., 
the expected evolution of the debt to GDP ratio based on the forecasts and in the absence of any 
additional shocks) is also included. 
Figure 2 combines four possible scenarios together with the baseline case. Each scenario 
represents different levels of insurance coverage, as follows: (i) Belize does not have insurance 
against hurricanes, (ii) Belize has insurance against hurricanes with a limit of US$30 million and 
pays insurance premium of US$1.6 million, and (iii) Belize has insurance against hurricanes with 
a limit of US$120 million and pays an insurance premium of US$6.4 million. Finally, for 
comparability purposes, we include a hypothetical scenario (iv) in which the country is free from 
the risk of hurricanes. The latter scenario is introduced in order to evaluate how the different 
levels of insurance allow the country to get closer to the situation that it would face if it had no 
risk of hurricanes. Scenario (ii) is of particular interest, as it is the one that mimics the World 
Bank’s proposal for Belize under the CCRIF. Scenario (iii) quadruples the coverage limit to 
assess the potential benefits of a much larger coverage. Our sensitivity tests suggest that US$120 
million of coverage is approximately the tipping point, whereby the costs of a higher level of 
insurance start to outweigh the benefits (as will be discussed further below).   15  
In this exercise the government starts from a vulnerable position: a debt to GDP ratio 
around 90 percent (in the year 2005, which is the start of the simulation period).
17 The baseline 
scenario—which illustrates the expected debt-to-GDP trajectory if the government complies with 
the fiscal target of a surplus of approximately 3.3 percent of GDP, the economy grows at 
approximately 5.1 percent on average, interest payments on debt are as projected by the IMF (see 
Table 1 for details), and the economy is not hit by any unexpected shocks—shows the debt to 
GDP ratio reaching a level of approximately 70 percent by 2020, with a declining tendency. If 
the economy is only prone to normal volatility (i.e., no risk of hurricanes), then with a 98 percent 
probability the debt to GDP ratio could reach by 2020 anywhere between approximately 110 
percent of GDP (worst-case scenario) to under 30 percent of GDP (best-case scenario). In other 
words, this range is the cone of uncertainty around the baseline scenario in the hypothetical case 
that the economy is not under risk of natural disasters.  
But Belize is prone to hurricanes and the costs of these to the economy are significant. 
Taking disaster risk into account, and incorporating the incidence of hurricanes to the equation of 
the evolution of the debt to GDP ratio, the cone of uncertainty around the baseline scenario 
expands to almost 170 percent of GDP in the worst-case scenario, and to a little under 50 percent 
of GDP in the best-case scenario. This is evidence that hurricanes, in and on themselves, worsen 
the debt sustainability picture considerably by increasing the likelihood of explosive debt to GDP 
trajectories, simultaneously reducing the chances of declining trajectories.  
How can catastrophic risk insurance help to improve debt sustainability? The results 
show that an insurance level of US$30 million (as proposed by the World Bank under the 
CCRIF) reduces the cone of uncertainty in the direction of the case without hurricanes, but only 
moderately so by the year 2020. However, as expected, bigger insurance limits render bigger 
reductions in uncertainty over future debt to GDP paths. An insurance with limit of U$120 
million reduces the range of possible outcomes by approximately 20 percentage points without a 
significant impact on the baseline debt path. In the worst-case scenario the debt to GDP ratio 
falls to approximately 150 percent of GDP by 2020 (still above the 110 percent level of the case 
without hurricanes, but below the 170 percent level of the case without insurance), while in the 
best-case scenario the debt ratio stabilizes at approximately 50 percent of GDP (approximately 
                                                       
17 The debt restructuring process, ended in January 2007, does not include reductions in the face value of the debt 
(i.e.,  nominal haircut).    16  
the same level as the case without insurance, but still above the 30 percent level of the case 
without hurricanes).   
Our sensitivity tests suggest that U$S 120 million is approximately the optimal level of 
insurance for Belize in terms of debt-sustainability. The calculations are summarized in Table 4. 
This table shows the maximum (worst-case scenario) and the minimum (best-case scenario) level 
of the debt to GDP ratio for Belize by the year 2020, as well as the range (the difference between 
the maximum and minimum values) under different insurance coverage limits. Note that higher 
insurance levels are always associated with higher premiums and, when the coverage limit 
exceeds US$120 million, the higher premiums are not compensated by additional gains in terms 
of debt sustainability, as neither the minimum nor the maximum levels of the debt to GDP ratio 
fall by the year 2020. Although the range of the debt to GDP ratio still falls slightly when the 
coverage limit exceeds US$120 million, this is only because the minimum possible debt to GDP 
ratio increases by more than the maximum, which implies a worsening of debt sustainability. 
 
4.1 Indirect Gains from Disaster Insurance 
As the occurrence of disasters worsens debt sustainability, this fact will be reflected in the 
country’s borrowing conditions in financial markets. Natural disasters create a burden on fiscal 
resources that will worsen creditworthiness in the view of investors in most cases. The recent 
experience of Belize indicates that borrowing conditions deteriorated sharply in the aftermath of 
the natural disasters. Moreover, the pattern of deterioration of external financing conditions is 
evident in other emerging markets too.  In Table 5, we report results on the determinants of the 
EMBI spread (a proxy for country’s credit risk, and thus its cost of international borrowing) by 
augmenting the baseline specification proposed by González Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2005) to 
consider the incidence of wind storms.
18 The effect of hurricanes on sovereign spreads is 
captured by the point estimate of a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the month that the 
corresponding country is hit by a storm.
19 Column (1) shows that, on average, wind storms 
                                                       
18 The frequency of the data is monthly, and the sample consists of all emerging markets that are listed in the EMBI. 
See González and Levy-Yeyati (2005) for details.  
19 We consider wind storms that have been classified as natural disasters. According “EM-DAT” at least one of the 
following criteria must be fulfilled in order for an event to be classified as a natural disaster. First, 10 or more people 
killed. Second, 100 or more people affected/injured/homeless. Third, significant disaster (e.g., “worst disasters in the 
decade”). Fourth, significant damages (e.g., “most costly disaster”). Finally, declaration of a state of emergency 
and/or an appeal for international assistance.   17  
increase sovereign spreads by approximately 40 percent. In addition, column (2) shows that the 
impact is persistent over time, lasting sixth months after the occurrence of the catastrophic event.  
To incorporate this effect in the debt simulations, we assume that disaster insurance 
would facilitate a decrease in the level of Belize’s sovereign spreads as well as a simultaneous 
reduction in the volatility of the interest rate on sovereign debt.  Thus, we assume that, in the 
case of a US$30 million coverage limit, the existence of insurance permits a decrease in the 
sovereign spread of 20 percent (i.e., around 60 basis points), as well as a 20 percent decrease in 
the volatility of the interest rate applied to Belize’s debt. In other words, we suppose that the 
existence of insurance improves the conditions under which the country has access to external 
borrowing in both the level and volatility dimensions. With more insurance, the credit 
enhancement effects are possibly stronger. We assume that coverage of US$120 million lowers 
spreads by 40 percent  (i.e., around 120 basis points) and reduces volatility by 40 percent. While 
the specific assumptions are somewhat arbitrary, they are indicative of the potential benefits. In 
particular, note that by assuming that coverage of US$120 million lowers spreads by 40 percent, 
we are suggesting that this particular level of coverage (that we have identified as optimal for the 
case of Belize in terms of debt-sustainability) effectively eliminates the contemporaneous impact 
of hurricanes on borrowing costs identified in the regressions reported in Table 5. 
Figure 3 shows the same set of simulations as Figure 2, but under the assumption that 
catastrophic risk insurance has the aforementioned additional beneficial effects in terms of 
market access. The results show that now, even insurance with a maximum limit of US$30 
million has non-negligible beneficial effects in terms of improved debt sustainability for Belize. 
In the worst-case scenario, the debt to GDP ratio falls from 170 percent of GDP by 2020, to 
below 160 percent with US$30 million in insurance, and to approximately 145 percent with 
US$120 million insurance (recall that in the case without hurricanes the worst-case scenario has 
a debt to GDP ratio of 110 percent by 2020). In the best-case scenario, the debt to GDP ratio 
stabilizes at slightly over 50 percent for both levels of insurance. This is still worse than the 
hypothetical case of no hurricanes, but approximately the same as the case with no insurance. 
Finally, in Figure 4 we incorporate an additional stabilizing effect of catastrophic risk 
insurance by assuming that it also helps to mitigate the output fluctuations which are so common 
in the aftermath of these events. For example, if insurance reduces the debt hikes caused by the 
hurricanes, then credit access might be maintained, enabling a faster and smoother recovery of   18  
economic activity. Also, if the insurance contract provides a stable flow of funds that guarantees 
that the government is able to continue its operations, then overall economic activity might suffer 
a smaller disruption. All in all, the idea that insurance could help to mitigate output volatility 
seems reasonable. In addition, the existing cross-country empirical evidence on output 
fluctuations suggests that less aggregate volatility might itself increase growth rates.
20 Therefore, 
in this set of simulations we assume that insurance with a limit of US$30 million causes a 
decrease in the volatility of  t y Δ of 10 percent, and an increase in the growth rate equivalent to 
0.75 percent per annum. These effects are in addition to the effects on the interest rate and 
interest rate volatility. Similarly, an insurance with a limit of US$120 million produces a 
decrease in the volatility of  t y Δ of 20 percent, and a increase in the level of growth equivalent to 
1.5 percent per annum. Once again, while these assumptions are evidently arbitrary, they are 
indicative of the enhanced potential benefits of insurance. These additional stabilizing effects of 
insurance have the result of reducing the cone of uncertainty of the debt to GDP ratio even more. 
With insurance, the distribution of probable outcomes of the debt to GDP ratio approximates 
more closely the hypothetical case of no hurricanes.  
In summary, the results suggest that catastrophic risk insurance helps to mitigate the 
impact of hurricanes by reducing the cone of uncertainty around the baseline debt to GDP 
trajectory. An insurance level of US$120 million goes a long way towards replicating the 
probable outcomes of the debt to GDP trajectories that would prevail in the hypothetical case of 
no hurricanes, especially if we assume that insurance has also stabilizing effects in terms of 
output and financial conditions. Our sensitivity tests suggest that US$120 million of coverage is 
approximately the tipping point beyond which the costs of higher level of insurance start to 
outweigh the benefits. 
 
5. The Dark Side of Insurance 
Insurance markets are imperfect in most cases. It has been well documented in the literature that 
moral hazard is a big problem in insurance markets (see, for example, Stiglitz 1977 and 1983). 
Moral hazard in the insurance context is a phenomenon whereby the insured takes more risks just 
because it is insured. Parsons (2003) defines moral hazard as “essentially an incentive problem, 
                                                       
20 See, for example, Ramey and Ramey (1995).   19  
arising from asymmetric information of agents and the difficulty that insurers have in 
discriminating between the actions of the insured on the one hand, and exogenous uncertainty on 
the other” (p. 451). Taking this definition as a benchmark, one can ask whether catastrophic risk 
insurance for government budget is susceptible to moral hazard problems.  
At a first level the answer is “no” because hurricanes are by definition exogenous events. 
Indeed, the background document of the CCRIF argues that “Parametric insurance policies 
offered by the CCRIF are exempt from moral hazard because the indexes used in the calculation 
of the indemnity payouts (for example, wind speed, ground motion) are independent of the 
individual actions of the governments” (page 57). While this is true, it refers only to one source 
of moral hazard, namely the “policyholder hazard.” The latter is defined in the Parsons (2003) 
taxonomy as the moral hazard that arises from the possibility that the policyholder, knowing that 
he is insured, will change his behavior in a way that increases risks. 
There are, however, other sources of moral hazard that can be equally, or even potentially 
more troublesome than the policyholder hazard in the context of catastrophic risk insurance for 
government budgets. For example, it is possible that the private sector in insured countries would 
choose not to take out private insurance at all, in the expectation that the government will pay for 
reconstruction in the event of a catastrophe using the proceeds from its own insurance coverage. 
This is important because with lower levels of private insurance, the size of the government’s 
contingent liabilities grows, rendering any level of public insurance less effective. Therefore, 
while with catastrophic risk the policyholder hazard might be low, the “third party hazard” is 
potentially important, so the moral hazard problem is alive. Although there are no easy ways out 
of moral hazard problems, the government has tools to monitor and influence the behavior of the 
private sector. For example, appropriate regulation and enforcement could help mitigate third 
party hazard. There might be other ways too. One possibility is that the government makes 
payouts for emergency reconstruction of private properties based on the estimated value of the 
damaged property minus a deductible, so that each owner has incentives to privately insure for 
the amount of the deductible. In fact, deductibles and co-payments are mechanisms utilized 
commonly to limit moral hazard problems in insurance contracts. Another possibility is the 
assessment of extraordinary taxes on uninsured property and the publications of a list of     20  
uninsured properties in order to elicit peer-monitoring mechanisms.
21 The bottom line is that the 
dangers generated by third party hazard do not invalidate the benefits of catastrophic risk 
insurance, in the same way that policyholder hazard does not invalidate for example, the value of 
car insurance. Although policymakers should be aware of the dangers of moral hazard, and 
should be prepared to address them, they  should not disregard insurance altogether. 
Another potential problem associated with catastrophic risk insurance is that governments 
themselves might have few incentives to purchase insurance in the expectation that the 
international community will step in and provide foreign aid in the aftermath of a large-scale 
catastrophe. Perhaps surprisingly, the available data does not support that conjecture. As 
mentioned above, Bobba and Powell (2006), using a large panel dataset, find no evidence that 
natural disasters affect the pattern of bilateral and multilateral aid flows. This means that there is 
no evidence that aid is an appropriate substitute for insurance. Furthermore, even when there is  
an increase in aid in the aftermath of a particular catastrophe, according to the background 
document of the World Bank’s CCRIF, donors’ assistance can take a long time to materialize 
and usually is earmarked for specific investments. For example, Yang (2006) finds evidence that 
while hurricanes trigger increases in official development assistance,  they do so with a one-year 
lag. All in all, the evidence suggests that the expectation of a large surge in aid flows in the 
aftermath of natural disasters is over-optimistic.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Disaster risks are of huge magnitude in the Caribbean region and in Belize in particular. This 
paper made the case that hurricane insurance could enhance debt sustainability and economic 
performance more generally. Although market imperfections and political reticence have 
deterred the adoption of insurance, recent developments have improved the outlook on both 
fronts. 
International institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank can play a role is assisting countries to overcome the distortions in insurance markets, as 
well as helping to relax the internal political resistance to the purchase of insurance policies. On 
the one hand, the provision of adequate information on the potential benefits of insurance, as 
                                                       
21 See, for example, Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) on the potential importance of peer-monitoring mechanisms in 
mitigating moral hazard.   21  
well as on the risks associated with absence of insurance are important elements of persuasion. 
Furthermore, the involvement of these organizations in developing markets in which countries 
could purchase insurance at reasonable prices would go a long way towards reducing the barriers 
to entry that countries now face. That is one of the primary objectives of the CCRIF, under the 
leadership of the World Bank and with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank, 
among others. Once the process gets started and some countries sign on, peer pressure might 
help to bring other countries on board as well. Finally, international financial institutions, in their 
roles as donors, should perhaps consider making concessional loans or aid contingent on the 
government’s having previously purchased catastrophic risk insurance. All of these actions 
together can help to develop the right incentives and the appropriate instruments to expand the 
markets for government budget insurance against natural disasters.  
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Year        r
f 10 years treasury spread
2006 9.3 7.9 5.1 2.8 3.2
2007 5.1 7.4 5.1 2.3 3.3
2008 4.6 7.2 5.1 2.1 3.3
2009 4.7 7.8 5.2 2.6 3.3
2010 4.8 8.3 5.3 3.0 3.3
2011 5.1 7.6 5.3 2.3 3.3
2012 5.1 7.6 5.4 2.2 3.3
2013 5.1 7.6 5.4 2.2 3.3
2014 5.1 7.6 5.4 2.2 3.3
2015 5.1 7.6 5.4 2.2 3.3
2015 - 2020 * 5.1 7.6 5.4 2.2 3.3
Standard Deviation 2.7 1.2 4.0
Table 1: Forecast and Standard deviations
Source: IMF
* Projections are based on the extension of IMF forecasts year end in 2011.
t y Δ t f
Table 2: Probability Distribution and Cost of Hurricanes by Category
H u r r i c a n e  C a t e g o r y 1234567
Probability of ocurrence (%) 13.0 8.0 5.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 0.4
Cost (% GDP) 2.5 5.0 7.5 10 13 22 35
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Source: World Bank (2006), author's elaboration.
Table 3: Cost of Hurricane Insurance
Insurance Amount
(US$ millions) Min Max Range
0 0.46 1.66 1.20
30 0.53 1.65 1.12
60 0.51 1.54 1.03
120 0.50 1.49 0.99
180 0.53 1.50 0.97
240 0.58 1.52 0.94
Source: Author's elaboration.
Table 4: Optimal Insurance
Debt over GDP, year 2020  31  
 
 
Note: Regressions are based on the baseline specification proposed by González Rozada 




Ln (EMBIt) Ln (EMBIt)
Ln(High Yieldt) 0.586*** 0.646***
(0.132) (0.117)






















Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Wind Storms and Emerging Market Spreads